

22 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CLINE

SUBJECT: Planning Group Discussion of Counter Insurgency

1. The first item on the agenda deals with a program for sending small teams of senior US military officials for orientation tours in countries that may have insurgency problems. The program appears to have encountered some static from some of the US Embassies. It appears to me to be a sensible program and one that might pay valuable dividends in equipping us with officers with first hand knowledge of areas in which we might have to take military action of one kind or another.

2. The second item deals with "Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements". The paper provided for this item discusses background, lists the paramilitary assets of US armed forces, and discusses current deficiencies among indigenous forces and US assets. The paper concludes with a list of nine actions that should be taken to correct deficiencies.

3. I have two general comments after which I will comment on some of the specific recommendations.

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a. There is a fundamental misconception of Communist doctrine which runs throughout the paper. It defines paramilitary forces as those that exist alongside armed forces and are professedly non-military, although they have an overriding military pattern and a military potential. The paper cites the situations in Laos and South Vietnam as examples of attack by Communist paramilitary forces. In fact, both Mao and Giap in their writings are quite explicit in explaining how guerrilla forces may be used to create and build up regular armed forces which are the means by which final victory is achieved. Tactics that work against guerrillas don't necessarily work against regular forces. There is ample evidence that the Communist forces in both Laos and South Vietnam are already organized on a regular military basis, although Communist guerrillas not so organized are also being employed in both areas.

b. I have not yet seen a single paper discussing counter insurgency problems, including this one, which adequately recognizes the size and complexity of the intelligence organization that is required to support a successful counter insurgency operation. Many writers on this subject recognize that intelligence is essential, and some go so far as to outline specific intelligence tasks that should be performed, but none have adequately recognized that this type of operation needs an extensive

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tactical COMINT operation, a photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation capability, ~~and~~ large scale covert collation net, interrogation centers, documents analysts, and a massive analytical apparatus equipped with order of battle experts, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, etc. to process the material collected and apply it to operational problems in a rapid and meaningful fashion.

4. The following specific recommendations are of direct interest to CIA.

Number 1 states that more special forces teams should be assigned to support covert paramilitary operations. I believe that this need has arisen because of the inadequacy of our own paramilitary training. We have people who know the techniques but they are ~~few~~ far too few in number and we have to make up their lack by using army special forces teams who are well prepared in the military sense but who do not have some of the training in covert operations that would be desirable.

Number 2 recognizes this situation and recommends the augmentation of US civilian paramilitary capabilities and personnel. I assume that this recommendation is aimed directly at CIA.

Number 3 recommends that all interested agencies assign young officers to crisis countries for duty and/or orientation tours to build up a reservoir of experienced personnel. I think this is a sound recommendation but it obviously runs into

problems created by personnel ceilings and the competition for personnel for the many tasks facing us.

Number 4 is addressed to the problem of shifting AID support from municipal police to provincial police and says that recommendations *along this* line will be forthcoming later.


Number 6 says that there should be further study of the expanded use of 3rd country personnel. This will obviously involve CIA.

Number 7 praises the CIA effort with the tribesmen in Laos and recommends a study of the use of similar groups in other countries. This looks like another task for CIA.

Number 8 recommends a study to improve the personnel programs of the armed forces and appropriate civil agencies (this obviously includes CIA) for unconventional warfare activities.

Number 9 recommends providing training and other assistance to help create more efficient indigenous intelligence collation mechanisms. This points in the direction of the need I described in paragraph 3 b above.

5. If you need any more talking points, you can always mention the new CIA military reserve program for training our own reservists in counter insurgency matters. We are organizing the reserves into 5 training groups, each one targeted toward a major area of the world.



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